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NOTES
the terms of an agreement. Although only good intentions may
motivate the Board, governmental determination of substantive
terms would destroy the collective bargaining process since there
would be no "bargaining" between the private parties. The col-
lective bargaining process is valuable in maintaining peaceful
labor relations. Congress evidently agreed when it made the en-
couragement of collective bargaining a major policy of the NLRA.
The broad remedial power given to the Board to effectuate this
policy should not be used to destroy it. Therefore, the Board's
remedial power must necessarily be limited so as to encourage
bargaining between labor and management.88
Edward A. Griffis
MINERAL LEASES-LESSEE DRAINING OTHER OF His LEASED
PREMISES CONSIDERED AS AN AcTIVE BREACH
Plaintiff-lessors sued their lessee in federal district court'
seeking an accounting for drainage of oil and gas from beneath
their premises caused by lessee's operations on adjoining prem-
ises. In the alternative plaintiffs prayed for damages for drain-
age because of lessee's breach of the implied obligation to pro-
tect the leased premises from drainage. Defendant-lessee moved
for summary judgment, claiming inter alia that plaintiffs' failure
to place lessee in default barred their action for damages. The
motion was denied as to the necessity of a putting in default.
Both parties appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed, hold-
ing that the failure of lessors to give notice in this case and
under these circumstances would not bar their action for damages
because Louisiana courts2 would characterize lessee's failure to
prevent drainage as an active breach of the lease contract. Wil-
liams v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 432 F.2d 165 (5th Cir.
1970), rehearing denied, 435 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1970).
The question of recovery of damages for drainage was put
38. H. K. Porter v. NLRB, 90 S. Ct. 821, 826 (1970): "It may well be true,
as the Court of Appeals felt, that the present remedial powers of the Board
are insufficiently broad to cope with important labor problems. But it is
the job of Congress, not the Board nor the courts to decide when and if it Is
necessary to allow governmental review of proposals for collective bargain-
ing agreements and compulsory submission to one side's demands."
1. Federal jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship under 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
2. Since there was no federal law governing the case the federal courts
were bound to apply the law of the forum state under the doctrine of Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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squarely before a Louisiana court in Breaux v. Pan American
Petroleum Corp.3 Plaintiff-lessor sued his lessee for damages
caused by drainage of the leased premises through the lessee's
operations on an adjoining lease. The case was dismissed by
the district court on defendant's exception of no cause of action.
The Third Circuit affirmed, but on different grounds. After
enumerating the elements which a plaintiff would have to allege
and prove in order to support a successful action for damages
for drainage, the appellate court held that the plaintiff had failed
to allege sufficient facts to support such a cause of action.4 As
it is the breach of a contractual duty that is complained of,
namely the breach of the implied obligation to protect from
drainage, it is logical and legally correct to allow damages, espe-
cially when it may be in the best interests of both parties to
continue, rather than dissolve," the lease. It is clear, therefore,
that the court in Breaux intended to recognize the existence of
a cause of action" for damages for drainage; it cannot seriously
be contended that this was not the court's purpose in holding as
it did.
There are two common situations in which the lessee is in-
volved in questions of drainage from beneath his leased prem-
ises. The first occurs when the lessee holds the lease only upon
the tract being drained. Then, the prospect of loss will usually
motivate the lessee to take steps to protect himself from drain-
age, thereby serving both his and his lessor's best interests. The
second situation occurs when, as in Williams, the lessee owns
leases on adjoining tracts, one of which is draining the other.
In such instances it is economically advantageous for the lessee
3. 163 So.2d 406 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 246 La. 581, 165 So.2d
481 (1964).
4. Id. at 415-16. The Breaux case is also important for its strong dictum
that the implied obligation to protect the leased premises from drainage in-
cludes the duty to unitize the leased premises, along with the already recog-
nized duty to drill offset wells. Both of these stem from the broad obligation
of the lessee, implied in every mineral lease, to protect its leased premises
from drainage.
5. Prior to Breaux, plaintiffs usually sued for cancellation for breach of
the implied obligation. See, e.g., Coyle v. North American Oil Consol., 201
La. 99, 9 So.2d 473 (1942); Swope v. Holmes, 169 La. 17, 124 So. 131 (1929);
Hiller v. Humphreys Carbon Co., 165 La. 370, 115 So. 623 (1928); Pipes v.
Payne, 156 La. 791, 101 So. 144 (1924). One case was entertained in federal
court in which plaintiffs were allowed to sue for damages due from the
time of formally placing defendant in default, but damages prior to the date
of default were denied. Billeaud Planters, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 245 F.2d
14 (5th Cir. 1957).
6. It is unclear what prescriptive period will be applied to this action,
and from whence it begins to accrue.
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to minimize drilling costs by completing one well which will
produce from both premises. Thus, in the second situation, there
is no economic incentive for the lessee to protect the drained
premises.7 The lessee, in fact, would be tempted to allow self-
interest to prevail. A discussion of the consequences flowing
from the categorization of a lessee's failure to protect the leased
premises from drainage in such situations as either a passive or
active breach8 will illustrate the importance of the court's hold-
ing in Williams.
An active violation of contract occurs when something is
done which is inconsistent with the obligation of the contract;
a passive violation consists of failing to do what was covenanted
to be done-a mere omission.9 Damages are due from the mo-
ment an active breach takes place,10 whereas damages accrue
for a passive breach only from the time the obligor has been
put in default." Since liability theoretically begins when a per-
son knows of his fault, and since the law infers knowledge of
fault to the perpetrator of an active breach, the obligee's right to
damages begins at the moment of breach. However, one who pas-
sively breaches an obligation must be given notice of the im-
propriety of his actions by the obligee before the right to seek
damages arises. The essence of this notion is the awareness of
fault.'2
In the usual lessor-lessee relationship, the lessor is at a tech-
nological disadvantage and often does not have the ability to
determine whether drainage is occurring until he has suffered
substantial damage. The lessor would be without recourse for
damages caused by drainage during the interim between the
commencement of the drainage and the fulfillment of the re-
quirement of putting in default. To the average lessor this would
7. Hardy, Drainage of Oil and Gas from Adjoining Tracts-A Further
Development, 6 NAT. REs. J. 45, 51-52 (1966).
8. See generally The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1963-1964 Term-Mineral Leases, 25 LA. L. REV. 360 (1965); Walker, Implied
Drilling Obligations in Oil and Gas Leases in Louisiana, 1 LOYOLA L. REV. 1
(1941); Note, 18 LA. L. REV. 354 (1958).
9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1931.
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1932. See generally Sarpy, The Putting in Default as
a Prerequisite to a Suit in Louisiana, 1 LOYOLA L. REV. 127 (1942); Smith,
The Cloudy Concept of Default, 12TH INST. ON MINERAL LAW 3 (1965); Note, 18
LA. L. REV. 354 (1958).
11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1933.
12. See Note, 18 LA. L. REv. 354 (1958) for a full discussion of the notion
of fault in recovery of damages for breach of contract, in which the author
relies upon the writings of Toullier for authority.
1971]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
involve the loss of a significant amount of money. On the other
hand, holding the lessee's conduct to be an active breach means
that damages are due from the date the drainage actually began,
since the lessee knew, or reasonably should have known, that
his own operations were draining the leased premises. This
shifts the burden of economic loss to the lessee. However, there
is a question whether imposing the burden of ameliorating his
lessor's damages due to his own conduct can properly be called
a "loss."
Generally, the failure to comply with an implied obligation
in a mineral lease has been classified as a passive breach, re-
quiring that the defendant be put in default as a prerequisite to
suit for damages or dissolution.' 3 For example, it is settled that
the lessee's failure to further develop the leased premises is a
passive breach.14 In contrast the courts have held that under
certain circumstances a putting in default is not required for
failure to pay production royalties. However, it is doubtful
whether this is the rule or the exception.' 5 It was first held that
the failure to pay production royalties was an active breach in
the closely related cases of Bollinger v. Texas Co.-e and Melan-
con v. Texas Co.' 7 In both cases the lessee's withholding of
royalties to force the lessor to consent to the formation of volun-
tary production units was viewed as coercive conduct amounting
to an active breach. In the face of such knowing coercion by the
lessee, the court could find no need to make the lessee aware that
its actions were improper. The lessee's actions were clearly in-
consistent with its obligation under the lease.18
13. Savoy v. Tidewater Oil Co., 218 F. Supp. 607 (W.D. La. 1963), afl'd per
curtam, 326 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1964); Bollinger v. Republic Petroleum Corp.,
194 So.2d 139 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966); McDonald v. Grande Corp., 148 So.2d
441 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
14. Brown v. Sugar Creek Syndicate, 195 La. 865, 197 So. 583 (1940);
Hiller v. Humphreys Carbon Co., 165 La. 370, 115 So. 623 (1928); Pipes v.
Payne, 156 La. 791, 101 So. 144 (1924). Another example of a passive breach
is found in McDonald v. Grande Corp., 148 So.2d 441 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
There it was held that the lessee's failure to extricate his lessor from an
uneconomic unit at the same time the lessee extricated itself was a passive
breach of the obligation of acting in its lessor's best interests. The writer
takes exception to the McDonald holding, however, and feels that such con-
duct constituted an active breach, for reasons set forth in the text, 4nfra.
15. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970
Term-Mineral Rights, 31 LA. L. Rav. 263, 269-72 (1971).
16. 232 La. 637, 95 So.2d 132 (1957).
17. 230 La. 593, 89 So.2d 135 (1956).
18. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. However, from this sound
basic idea there has evolved a questionable doctrine that when royalties
are not paid for an appreciable length of time without justification the
[Vol. 31
1971] NOTES
In the instant case"9 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that a lessee actively breaches his obliga-
tion to prevent drainage when his operations on adjoining prem-
ises drain property which he holds under a different lessor. The
case was before the court on appeal from a denial of a motion
for summary judgment on the ground that the lessee was not
placed in default. Sitting as an Erie court 20 the Fifth Circuit was
bound to apply what it found to be Louisiana law.21
Humble first relied on specific provisions of the lease, citing
the clause requiring the lessor to serve notice in writing upon
the lessee when the former felt that the latter's conduct was
a breach of the lease. Lessee had sixty days after receipt of such
notice to comply with the particulars demanded by the lessor
and to avoid cancellation of the lease.22 The court stated as a
matter of law 28 that failure to give notice as required by the
lease contract was not a bar to suit in this case. Judge Wisdom
found that such clauses were inserted in lease contracts for the
purpose of protecting the lessee from forfeiture of the lease and,
as such, were inapplicable to suits for damages caused by drain-
age. He commented that this was the reason Louisiana courts
required strict compliance with such clauses. 24 From this writer's
breach is active in character. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1969-1970 Termb--Minera7 Rights, 31 LA. L. Riv. 263, 272 (1971).
19. 432 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970).
20. See note 2 supra.
21. Although such determinations of state law are not controlling in
state courts, they are binding in federal courts unless and until the state's
supreme court holds to the contrary. Therefore, the potential acceptance of
this case into the federal jurisprudence renders it significant. There Is, of
course, the possibility that the state courts may adopt this concept also. The
case is also worthy of comment In that It reflects a strong tendency toward
recognition of the mineral lessee's duty to unitize in order to protect from
drainage and states that a lessee's implied duty to prevent or to protect
from drainage cannot be precluded by an express offset provision. These as-
pects of the case are not discussed herein. Williams v. Humble Oil and Re-
fining Co., 432 F.2d 165, 174, 177-78 (5th Cir. 1970).
22. "And in the event the Lessor considers that operations are not being
conducted In compliance with this contract, Lessee shall be notified In writ-
ing of the facts relied upon as constituting a breach hereof and Lessee shall
have sixty (60) days after receipt of such notice to comply with the obliga-
tions imposed by virtue of this Instrument." Id. at 178-79.
23. The district court had held that it would be a matter for the jury
to decide, Williams v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 290 F. Supp. 408 (E.D,
La. 1968).
24. "On the other hand, an action for damages threatens no such
harsh consequences as termination of the lessee's interest. There Is less
reason to insist upon notice and demand. Indeed, in the ordinary drainage
action notice to the lessee would be superfluous. The harm has already
been committed, and no action by the lessee to repair the breach could
adversely affect the lessor's right to compensation for past harm. In many
cases the fact of injury is already known to the lessee, who has superior
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
examination of the Louisiana jurisprudence there appears to be
little reason for applying the demand clause in cases for cancel-
lation because of drainage and not applying it in cases seeking
damages for drainage. Although the Texas jurisprudence might
support this distinction,25 it is at best unclear whether such a
differentiation exists in Louisiana. Nevertheless, having asserted
this distinction, the court easily disposed of two cases relied upon
by Humble in stating that since they were cancellation cases,
notice should have been given.
26
Humble next urged that Billeaud Planters, Inc. v. Union Oil
Co. of California27 required a putting in default in cases such as
Williams. To this contention the court replied that in Billeaud
the lease itself unambiguously stated that if the lessor felt the
lessee was violating any express or implied obligation that notice
was a prerequisite to suit for any cause under the lease. There-
fore, the language in Billeaud declaring the breach of the obli-
gation to prevent drainage to be passive was not actually neces-
sary to the disposition of the case and was mere dictum .2  Ac-
knowledge of his own operations, long before it becomes known to the
lessor. The lessor's inability to give notice of that which he does not
know should not in all fairness bar him forever from recovery for damages
already incurred. The oil industry was undoubtedly conscious of these
considerations when the standard form notice provision in the instant
lease was drafted." Williams v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 432 F.2d 165,
179-80 (5th Cir. 1970).
25. Texas Oil and Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968); Shell
Oil Co. v. Stansbury, 401 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), error refused,
410 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1966).
26. Williams v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 432 F.2d 165, 180 (5th
Cir. 1970). The two cases might have been distinguished upon another
ground. Bollinger v. Republic Petroleum Corp., 194 So.2d 139 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1966) (action for cancellation for failure to pay shut-in royalties)
and Vance v. Hurley, 215 La. 805, 41 So.2d 724 (1949) (action for cancella-
tion based on agreement to pay remaining portion of production payment
at end of three-year period) were not cases involving damages for drainage
by the lessee.
27. 245 F.2d 14 (5th Cir. 1957).
28. There does seem to be credence in this statement by the court.
The Billeaud court, after stating that in Louisiana the contract between
the parties is the law of the case so long as it is not contra bonos mores
or violative of a prohibitive law, stated, "Hence, before appellants could
claim the right to damages for drainage whether by virtue of a breach
of appellee's express or implied obligations they were by their own
contract terms required as a prerequisite to the recovery of damages
'to notify Lessee in writing, setting out specifically in what respects lessee
ha[d] breached this contract.' The conditions of the contract are clear and
unambiguous and are to be construed as the parties must be supposed to
have understood them at the time of its execution. Our plain duty Is
confined strictly to the ascertainment of the rights and obligations of the
contracting parties as they have defined them for themselves." Id. at 18.
The Williams court felt that it was sufficient for the disposition of the
Billeaud case that the parties intended to require notice as a prerequisite
to an action for damages.
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cordingly, it held that the different language in the Billeaud and
Williams leases permitted different results.
Assuming the incorrectness of Judge Wisdom's holding that
default clauses are inapplicable in suits for damages, another
justification for not applying the notice clause lies in his reading
of the Billeaud case. By finding that the express language in
that lease, requiring notice and demand for breach of both ex-
press and implied obligations, was the actual basis for decision
in that case, Judge Wisdom implied that absent such specific
language the general law of putting in default as a prerequisite
for damages would control as to implied obligations. Similarly,
it could be argued that unless the notice clause specifically pro-
vides otherwise, the requirement of putting in default would
apply only to cases of non-performance classified as passive
breaches.
The Williams court analogized the situation facing it to
cases where failures to pay production royalties were seen as
active breaches because they were actions inconsistent with the
obligations imposed by the lease contracts.29 The court reasoned
that when the lessee is causing drainage from that portion of
the lessor's premises upon which it owns the lease, it is not
merely failing to protect against drainage, but is acting with
knowledge (or in circumstances in which a reasonably prudent
operator would have knowledge) in a manner inconsistent with
its obligation to protect from drainage.30 Additionally, it was
found necessary to take the question of whether the lessee's
actions constituted an active or passive breach out of the hands
of the jury3 ' to avoid the possibility of arbitrary decision-
making.8 2
In denying the petition for rehearing3 the court reiterated
its stand upon the Billeaud case and the cases finding active
breaches for failure to pay production royalties. Humble also
alleged in its petition for rehearing that the Breaux case stood
for the proposition that a lessor has no greater rights against
29. 432 F.2d 165, 181-82 (5th Cir. 1970).
30. Id.
31. See note 23 supra.
32. Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 432 F.2d 165, 181 (5th Cir.
1970). Undoubtedly some will argue that the classification of this action
by Humble as an active breach is arbitrary decision-making of the highest
order.
33. 435 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1970).
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its own lessee who is draining the former's leased premises than
it does against a third party, and, therefore, placing the lessee in
default is necessary in both situations. The court of appeals
found that the Breaux case was not concerned with whether an
active or passive breach had taken place, but with whether there
is a cause of action for damages caused by drainage; and, if so,
whether the nature of the cause of action is different where
there is a common lessee on the draining and drained tracts.
Consequently, the court's statement in Breaux that the lessor
had no greater rights against his lessee when the lessee was the
one responsible for the drainage was correct,3 4 but was con-
cerned with the allegations of the measure of damages a lessor
could recover rather than with the need of a putting in default85
In considering the impact of this decision, it should be
noted that the concept of active breach applies only in situations
where a lessee, by his own operations on adjoining premises,
drains oil and gas from his adjacent lessor's premises. The need
of putting a lessee in default for the failure to protect from or
to prevent drainage occasioned by a third person has not been
abrogated. In holding the action of the lessee to be an active
breach, the Williams court emphasized that Humble itself had
caused the drainage. By this means the court justified its state-
ment that the lessee was actually doing something inconsistent
with its obligation, rather than merely failing to do something
the contract had bound it to do.8
From a practical standpoint, it would seem that this decision
is desirable. When a lessee is producing from the premises ad-
joining those it has under lease from a different lessor, he has
full control of that operation. The lessee's superior technical
resources and economic advantage would certainly indicate that
he should be aware that drainage is occurring. A lessee in the
Williams type situation should not be allowed to contend that
his only fault was a passive omission to act.3 7 In these situations
34. For a criticism of this concept, see Hardy, Drainage of Oil and Gas
from Adjoining Tracts-A Further Development, 6 NAT. REs J. 45 (1966);
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term-
Mineral Leases, 25 LA. L. Rov. 360, 360-68 (1965).
35. Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 435 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1970).
36. Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 432 F.2d 165, 181-82 (5th Cir.
1970).
37. Note, 18 LA. L. Rsv. 354, 359-60 (1958). See also notes 8-11 supra
and accompanying text.
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the temptation of the lessee to minimize his costs and exact a
greater profit by not acting to prevent drainage from the other
premises is tremendous.88 The average lessor is in a vastly in-
ferior position concerning access to technical data and the facili-
ties to decipher its meaning. To require a putting in default by
the lessor under the circumstances presented in Williams would
place upon him a burden of keeping constant vigil on the opera-
tions on adjoining tracts-a burden properly borne by the lessee.
The interests of lessees are admittedly prejudiced by allowing
damages to be computed from the moment the lessee had, or
should have had, knowledge that his operations were causing
drainage, rather than from the time the lessor could ascertain the
fact and make a demand upon the lessee. However, it does not
seem unfair that the lessee's burden may thereby be increased;
had he performed his duty initially, the burden would not exist.3 9
Had the court accepted Humble's contention that its opera-
tions constituted a mere passive breach, it would be difficult to
conceive of a situation where an active breach could be found.
Humble's argument that a failure to prevent and to protect from
drainage constituted a mere omission and, therefore, a passive
breach would have been correct if a third party caused the drain-
age. However, Humble's actual or constructive knowledge that
its own operations caused the drainage prevented acceptance of
its contention. An analogy to the situations in the Bollinger and
Meiancon cases illustrates this fact. Whether a lessee refuses
to pay royalties in an attempt to coerce his lessor into some
action, or drains his lessor's tract by operations on adjoining
premises, he is acting with actual or constructive knowledge of
the impropriety of his act. To say that a putting in default is
required, therefore, would be to require that the lessor do a
"vain and useless thing";40 the lessee is already aware of his
breach.
Another rationale exists for relieving the lessor of the burden
of placing his lessee in default. Under Civil Code article 1933 (1) 41
38. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
39. Hardy, Drainage oj Oil and Gas from Adjoining Tracts--A Further
Development, 6 NAT. RES. J. 45 (1966).
40. Voss v. Roach, 35 So.2d 142 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948).
41. "When the thing to be given or done by the contract was of such
a nature, that it could only be given or done'within a certain time, which
has elapsed, or under certain circumstances, which no longer exist, the
debtor need not be put in legal delay to entitle the creditor to damages."
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the creditor need not put his debtor in default when the contract
is of such a nature that it could be performed only under certain
circumstances, which no longer exist, or at a particular time,
which has elapsed. This article contemplates a situation where
action at a precise time is required. If steps are not taken at
the moment drainage begins, there is no way the lessor can be
protected against drainage which has already occurred, and he
should, therefore, be entitled to recover for past drainage.42
The situations in the Williams, Bollinger, and Melancon cases
may be compared to those where Louisiana courts have held that
a refusal to perform or a denial of the existence of an obligation
were active breaches.43 If Humble were causing drainage, it re-
fused to perform its obligation to prevent and to protect from
drainage. Such conduct also seems to amount, at least, to an
implied denial of the existence of the obligation; the lessee would
be clearly at fault. If Humble were draining its lessor's premises,
that act is equivalent to doing something inconsistent with its
obligations both to prevent drainage and to protect the leased
premises. Therefore, this action would seem to fall squarely
within the scope of article 1931. 4
It is safe to assume that the court's decision was not com-
pelled merely by a reading of prior jurisprudence, but was in-
stead an attempt to provide the lessor with a more effective
remedy to protect his lease from drainage by his own lessee. If
the decision stands, it will cause operators to adopt a more
cautious attitude when drilling on premises adjoining other prop-
erty upon which they also own leases. This does not mean that
drilling and exploration will be hampered. A lessee can still
defend any failure to drill offset wells by asserting the economic
infeasibility of such operations. In such cases the remedy of the
LA. Civ. CODja art. 1933(1). See Chattanooga Car & Foundry Co. v. Lefebvre,
113 La. 487, 37 So. 38 (1904); Williams Lumber Co. v. Stewart Gast & Bros.,
21 So.2d 773 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1945).
42. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term-
Mineral Rights, 25 LA. L. Rv. 360, 365 n.11 (1965). However, this approach
might also indicate that failure to protect from drainage caused by third
parties is an active breach.
43. Stockelback v. Bradley, 159 La. 336, 105 So. 363 (1925); Johnson v.
Levy, 122 La. 118, 47 So. 422 (1908); Southern Sawmill Co. v. Ducote, 120 La.
1052, 46 So. 20 (1908); Jones v. Whittington, 171 So.2d 764 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 247 La. 624, 172 So.2d 703 (1965).
44. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 31
NOTES
lessor would be to demand that his lessee unitize the drained
acreage or to seek unitization himself.4 5
In response to this decision, lessees may attempt to amend
the default clause of the standard lease forms to require notice
as a prerequisite to suits seeking either damages or cancellation
for active or passive breaches of express or implied obligations.
The Williams court indicated approval of this approach by citing
the Billeaud case as standing for the proposition that the parties
could insert such a clause in the lease contract. Although the
Civil Code states that no default is necessary when an active
breach has occurred, 46 the parties can by their own contract
make the law that will bind them so long as the contract is not
contra bonos mores or violative of some prohibitive law. 47 How-
ever, enforcement of such a provision would place the lessor in
the same position which some thought he occupied prior to the
decision in Williams. The lessor would be returned to his dis-
advantaged economic and technical posture in a situation in
which the temptations are strong for the lessee to permit eco-
nomic self-interest to overcome his obligation to administer the
lease for the mutual benefit of both parties. The use of such a
clause is questionable in view of the fact that most lessors are
not equipped to perceive the subtleties of such a contractual
provision.
It is suggested that the courts use article 1901 of the Civil
Code,48 requiring that all contracts be performed in good faith,
to prohibit such a provision. In the decisions in which Louisiana
courts have found refusal to pay production royalties for the
purpose of coercing particular action on the part of the lessor,
the conduct of the lessee can be equated to bad faith.49 In a situa-
tion in which the lessee is draining his lessor's property with
actual or constructive knowledge of that fact, it is but a small
extension of the Williams concept to find that such conduct
amounts to bad faith within the meaning of article 1901. Clearly,
it would be against public policy to permit a party to contract
away his right to receive performance in good faith. It should
45. LA. R.S. 30:6(F) (1950), which provides that any interested party can
seek unitization.
46. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1932.
47. Id. arts. 1895, 1901, 1945.
48. Id. art. 1901: "Agreements legally entered into ... must be performed
with good faith."
49. Bollinger v. Texas Co., 232 La. 637, 95 So.2d 132 (1957); Melancon v.
Texas Co., 230 La. 593, 89 So.2d 135 (1956).
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be pointed out that when article 1901 speaks of "bad faith" it is
altogether different from that sort. of conduct which is labeled
"fraud."5 0 Although the lessee's bad faith in such a situation does
not amount to fraud, this does not mean that he is not at fault.
This suggests another reason to forbid such provisions. If the
lessor cannot contract away his right to receive performance in
good faith, a fortiori, the lessee cannot contract away his fault
and thereby vitiate his duty to perform his obligation in good
faith. This course of reasoning would thus permit courts to avoid
attempts to circumvent the Williams decision by contract. It is
urged that they do so.
An equitable solution to the problem may be the adoption
of a scheme of compensatory royalties comparable to that con-
tained in paragraph five of the Louisiana state lease form.5 ' It
50. See 2 PLANIOL, CIviL LAw TREAMSE 1060-69 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
51. Louisiana State Lease Form Revised (1966):
5. The obligations set forth in this Article are applicable only to
wells drilled on (1) property which is not owned by Lessor or (2)
property in which Lessor has no interest, and which in either instance
is not part of a pooled unit containing all or any portion of the leased
property. Such property is hereinafter described in this Article as
"adjoining property."
(a) If at any time during or after the primary term there is com-
pleted on adjoining property a well located within six hundred and
sixty (660) feet of the leased premises (or within any spacing or pooling
unit distance greater than 660 feet established by the Commissioner of
Conservation) and such well produces oil, gas, or other liquid or
gaseous hydrocarbons in paying quantities for twenty (20) days (which
need not be consecutive) during any period of thirty (30) days, or
produces its monthly allowable during such thirty (30) day period,
rebuttable presumptions will arise: (1) that the leased premises are
thereby being drained; (2) that the leased premises are not being
reasonably protected from drainage by any well or wells on the leased
premises or land pooled therewith; and (3) that an offsetting well on
the leased premises would be economically feasible. If Lessee is the
operator of or has a working interest in the adjoining property, Lessee
will begin operations for the drilling of a well on the leased premises
upon expiration of ninety (90) days after the end of the above thirty
(30) day period. In all other cases Lessee shall be required to begin
operations only upon expiration of ninety (90) days after receipt of
written notice from the Board of the expiration of the above thirty
(30) day period. No offset well shall be necessary if, on or before the
maturity date of the offset obligation or any deferred maturity date
as hereinafter provided, any of the stated presumptions is rebutted
or a unit for the well in question embracing all or part of the leased
premises is formed by agreement with the Board or by order of the
Commissioner of Conservation.
In lieu of commencing operations for an offset well as above pro-
vided, Lessee may, at Lessee's option, commence compensatory pay-
ments equal to the royalties herein provided, computed on one-half
( ) of the oil, gas, or other liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons produced
by the well in question on and after the date operations would have
otherwise been commenced, value to be determined in accordance with
the provisions of Article 6 of this lease. Such payments may be com-
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provides that if any well is drilled and is producing on adjoining
property within six hundred-sixty feet of the leased premises,
rebuttable presumptions arise that (1) the leased premises are
being drained, (2) the leased premises are not being reasonably
protected from drainage by well(s) on the leased premises or
land pooled therewith, and (3) that drilling a well on the leased
premises to offset the drainage would be economically feasible.
The lessee has the affirmative duty to begin an offset well when
it is the operator on adjoining premises, but may avoid drilling
menced on or before sixty (60) days after the date operations would
otherwise have been commenced, but shall include any accrued com-
pensatory payments. Thereafter, payments shall be due monthly in
accordance with Article 6(i). Lessee shall not be in default in either
commencing compensatory payments or in making further payments
as above provided if despite due diligence Lessee is unable timely to
obtain the production information on which such payments are to be
based. In any such case, however, Lessee must on or before the due
date of the payments, notify the Board in writing of Lessee's inability
to make such payment, the reasons therefor, and Lessee's intent to
make such payment at the earliest reasonable time. Compensatory pay-
ments may be continued, at Lessee's discretion, for not more than one
year from the date on which offset operations would otherwise have
been commenced. At the end of that time, or within 30 days from the
end of any lesser period for which payments are made, Lessee shall
comply with this offset obligation if the producing well continues to
produce in paying quantities or to produce its allowable and the other
conditions making this obligation operative are existent. The right to
make compensatory payments is intended to permit Lessee to evaluate
further the producing well, and the making of such payments shall
not of itself be sufficient to maintain this lease in force and effect;
however, the making of any such payments shall not prejudice Lessee's
right to rebut any of the above enumerated presumptions.
(b) In addition to the specific offset drilling obligation above pro-
vided, Lessee agrees to drill any and all wells necessary to protect the
leased premises from drainage of oil, gas, or other liquid or gaseous
hydrocarbons by a well or wells on adjoining property or to take any
other steps reasonably necessary to protect the leased premises against
such drainage, including, but not limited to, obtaining the formation
of appropriate drilling or production units. If Lessee Is the operator
of or has a working interest in any well on adjoining property Lessee
shall be obligated to begin operations for the drilling of a well on the
leased premises or to take such other steps as may be reasonably
necessary to protect the leased premises upon expiration of ninety (90)
days from the time Lessee knows or reasonably should know that
drainage is occurring. In all other cases, Lessee shall be obligated to
begin such operations or take such other steps only upon the expira-
tion of ninety (90) days after receipt of written notice from the Board.
(c) In those instances in which notice is expressly required under
paragraph (a) or (b), above, damages, if due, shall be computed only
from the date on which notice is received or, if Lessee commences
compensatory payments, the date on which such payments are dis-
continued. In those instances in which there is no requirement of
notice under (a) or (b), above, damages, if due, shall be computed from
the time Lessee knew or reasonably should have known drainage was
occurring. Written notice containing a demand for performance shall
be necessary as a prerequisite to any action for cancellation of the
lease by Lessor for nonperformance of any obligations of Lessee to
protect the leased premises against drainage.
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by paying compensatory royalties to its lessor computed on one-
half the production of the presumed draining well. Making such
payments merely permits the lessee to evaluate further the pro-
ducing well and will not alone be sufficient to continue the lease
in force; however, the lessee's right to rebut the above presump-
tions is not prejudiced by compensatory royalty payments. In
addition to the specific offset obligation outlined above, the
lessee also has the general obligation either to drill an offset well,
form a drilling or production unit, or take any other action
reasonably necessary to prevent drainage. Further, if the lessee
is the operator, or has a working interest in any well on ad-
joining property, he has ninety days from the time he knows
or reasonably should know drainage is occurring to drill an offset
well or to take other action reasonably necessary to protect the
leased premises from drainage. Should he fail to act within
ninety days, damages are computed from the time the lessee
knows or should know drainage is occurring.
The equities in such a plan are apparent. In the specific off-
set provision it is the lessee who has the burden of ascertaining
whether drainage is in fact occurring-a task he is well-equipped
to handle. By paying the compensatory royalties, the lessee buys
time during which he can conduct the necessary tests to deter-
mine what future course of action is required. At the same time
the lessor is saved from having to act as watchdog on the ad-
joining premises while being reimbursed in case his premises
are actually being drained. In the case of operations not covered
by the express offset provision the same result as that of the
Williams case is achieved.
The Williams decision places the lessor closer to parity with
the lessee; still, adequate defenses and protections are available
to prevent the latter from being treated unjustly. For this
reason, it is hoped that Williams will stand and that Louisiana
courts will see fit to affirm the proposition that it correctly states
the law of Louisiana.
James Louis Williams, IV
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DOUBLE JEOPARDY-ABOLITION OF THE DUAL
SOVEREIGNTY THEORY OF CITY-STATE PROSECUTIONS
A group of looters removed a canvas mural from the City
Hall of St. Petersburg, Florida. When the mural was recovered
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